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I. INTRODUCTION

In a ruling aimed at safeguarding an in-custody suspect's right against selfincrimination, the Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona' that state and
federal law enforcement officials must provide an in-custody suspect with a
warning containing some variation of the following rights prior to interrogation:
the right to remain silent and the right to the presence of counsel.2 If a suspect
understands his (hereinafter "his" refers to in-custody suspects of both sexes)
rights, he may waive any or all of the Miranda rights so long as the waiver is
made "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."3 Prosecutors have found
statements made after a voluntary waiver helpful for decades.4

* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 2008. M.A., English. 2001, B.A., English,
1999, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo. I would like to thank my wife, Laura, for her
support, and Professor George Harris for his guidance.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Id.at 444.
3. Id.
4. See Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary Law and
Understandings,90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 792 (2006) ("[M]odem studies demonstrate that roughly eighty percent
of suspects waive their Miranda rights and talk to the police.").
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In Miranda, the Court's primary concern was the "interrogation atmosphere
and the evils it can bring."' One of the core premises of the Miranda decision is
that in-custody interrogation is inherently coercive.6 The decision itself fully
discusses why in-custody interrogation creates such a coercive environment. For
this reason, the Court granted certiorari to "give concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow."'
Unfortunately, the result of the Miranda decision and the warnings the Court
announced have been anything but clear. 9 Specifically, Miranda's requirement of
an accused's right to the presence of counsel creates problems and
inconsistencies because circuit courts disagree about how specific this particular
Miranda warning must be to adequately protect a suspect's rights.' The Second,
Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal agree that a
suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is sufficiently
protected without an express warning of a suspect's right to have counsel present
during interrogation." Conversely, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit
Courts of Appeal hold that Miranda requires an explicit warning of the right to
the presence of counsel during interrogation. 2 The result has been an unfair one;
in-custody suspects who provide statements without having been clearly warned
of their right to the presence of counsel during interrogation are treated
differently in different jurisdictions. Some remain in jail, while others are free
due to successful appeals.
It is time for the Supreme Court to clarify the Mirandaholding to resolve the
circuit split and achieve the right balance between the government's interest in
successful interrogations and the individual's constitutional right against
compelled self-incrimination. A requirement of a uniform specific warning,
including the right to the presence of counsel during interrogation, would
virtually guarantee that every in-custody suspect is adequately informed of his

5. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456.
6. Id. at 457-58.
7. Id. at 440-61. "An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by
antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above cannot be otherwise than
under compulsion to speak." Id. at 461.
8. Id. at 441-42.
9. See Godsey, supra note 4, at 781-82 (explaining that the Miranda decision has received much
attention from scholars regarding its "real world" impact).
10. See United States v. Frankson, 83 F.3d 79, 81-82 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Caldwell, 954
F.2d 496, 499-504 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357, 361-62 (7th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Vanterpool, 394 F.2d 697, 698-99 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that warnings adequately protect constitutional
rights without explicitly stating that suspects may have counsel present during interrogation). But see United
States v. Tillman, 963 F.2d 137, 140-42 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir.
1984); United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669, 672-74 (10th Cir. 1981); Atwell v. United States, 398 F.2d 507,
510 (5th Cir. 1968) (requiring that suspects be told they have a right to counsel during interrogation).
11. Frankson, 83 F.3d at 81-82; Caldwell, 954 F.2d at 500-04; Adams, 484 F.2d at 361-62; Vanterpool,
394 F.2d at 698-99.
12. Tillman, 963 F.2d at 140-42; Noti, 731 F.2d at 615; Anthon, 648 F.2d at 672-74; Atwell, 398 F.2d at
510.
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rights established by Miranda and solve the circuit split that has led to
considerable confusion in Mirandajurisprudence.
This Comment examines the circuit split regarding the specificity required to
adequately warn an in-custody suspect of the right to have an attorney present
during interrogation. Next, this Comment highlights the problem of requiring that
in-custody suspects use inductive reasoning to arrive at the meaning contained in
Miranda warnings, and, ultimately, argues that in-custody suspects should not be
required to infer meaning. Rather, in-custody suspects should be given a uniform
warning of the right to the presence of counsel during interrogation, so that the
suspect may deduce logical and certain conclusions regarding this immensely
important right as established by Miranda.
H. THE WARNING REQUIREMENTS TO DATE
In Miranda, the Supreme Court created a set of warnings that investigators
must give an in-custody suspect before interrogation can begin. 3 The Court's
purpose in announcing the warnings was to protect the suspect's right against
compelled self-incrimination. 4 Absent the existence of adequate warnings to an
in-custody suspect, "no statement obtained from the defendant [during custodial
interrogation] can truly be the product of his free choice."' 5 Accordingly, the
Court held that "[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has
a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
or appointed."'' 6 However, this Comment focuses on the right to the presence of
an attorney specifically during interrogation.
The Miranda Court itself was inconsistent in describing the requirements of
warnings regarding the right to the presence of counsel during interrogation. At
some points in the decision, the Court seems only to require a general warning of
the right to the "presence of counsel."' 7 For example, the Court stated that
"[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed."' 8 Thus, some courts, such as the Fourth Circuit, have relied on the
above quote in holding that Miranda does not require a specific warning of the
9 Consequently, the
right to the presence of counsel during interrogation.'

13.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471-72.

14.

JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 416 (4th ed.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
Id. at 466.
Id. (emphasis added).
United States v. Frankson, 83 F.3d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1996).

2006).
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problem becomes one of timing; when does the right to presence of counsel
begin?
The Miranda decision also contains language regarding the warning
requirement's seemingly open-ended guidelines. The Court held:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting
the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the
exercise of their creative rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot
say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular
solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is
presently conducted. 0
Thus, the Court seemingly did not require particularized or uniform warnings
regarding this right. The circuits that focus on this language assert that it is the
concept of the right to the presence of counsel during interrogation that must be
conveyed, not necessarily the specific words.2
However, Miranda also conveys a contradictory message. Within a twelvepage span, the Court specifically mentioned six times that the warning must be
conveyed so as to inform a suspect of the right to the presence of counsel during
interrogation.2 The Court held: "Therefore, the right to have counsel present at
the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment
privilege under the system we delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the
individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered
throughout the interrogation process. 23 Courts that focus on this language and
similar language throughout the opinion reach the conclusion that Miranda
requires a specific warning of the right to the presence of counsel during
interrogation. 24
The circuit split comes down to inference. Courts that do not require a
specific warning of the right to the presence of an attorney during interrogation
generally hold that a reasonable person, given the circumstances of the particular
case, would conclude that he has the right to the presence of counsel during
interrogation.25 On the other hand, courts that require a more specific warning

20. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
21. Sweeney v. United States, 408 F.2d 121, 124 (9th Cir. 1969).
22. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466-77.
23. Id. at 469.
24. See Atwell v. United States, 398 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1968) ("The advice that the accused was
entitled to consult with an attorney, retained or appointed, 'at anytime' does not comply with Miranda's
directive 'that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with
a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation."' (citation omitted)).
25. See Sweeney, 408 F.2d at 124 (holding that "[tihe reference to the right to counsel following, as it
did, immediately on the warning as to the right to remain silent" would lead reasonable persons to conclude that
the right to the presence of counsel began immediately); United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 377 (2d Cir.
1970) (holding that the "'right to an attorney' preceded by a warning of the right "that he 'need not make any
statement to us at this time"' was enough to lead a reasonable person to conclude that the right to the presence
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often attack the chain of inference, especially under the pressures of
26
interrogation. Requiring a more specific warning, including the right to the
presence of counsel during interrogation, eliminates the need for persons in
custody and undergoing interrogation to arrive at their own conclusions about
their constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment.
III. INDUCTIVE INFERENCE AND FAULTY CONCLUSIONS

Inductive reasoning, otherwise known as inductive inference, is a general
conclusion based upon specific examples.27 Unlike deductive reasoning, which
leads to an inevitable logical conclusion, inductive reasoning leads to a
conclusion that at best is probably true. 29 A rudimentary example illustrates the
point: if a person is treated rudely by persons wearing purple hats on ten separate
occasions, that person would likely infer that persons who wear purple hats are
rude.30 Essentially, then, inductive reasoning is based upon a person's perception
of specific examples that lead to conclusions that may or may not be true. 3'
Perhaps the persons wearing purple hats and behaving rudely were part of a local
gang or another unruly crowd, leaving the affronted person with a distorted view
of all who wear purple hats.
A major problem with inductive inference is that perception of acquired data
may be distorted, influenced, or simply incorrect. 2 As Alfred North Whitehead
' 33
put it, "It]here is nothing basic in the clarity of our entertainment of sensa. ,
Each person might perceive or interpret different sensory stimuli or data in
differing manners, according to his or her frame of reference. 34 "Multiple
of an attorney included during interrogation).
26. See Atwell, 398 F.2d at 510 (holding that a reasonable person could not infer an adequate warning
based on the use of the word "anytime").
27. Mary Massaron Ross, A Basis For Legal Reasoning: Logic on Appeal, 3 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING
DIRECTORS 179, 182-83 (2006); Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational
Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 944 (1996).
28. See Vern R. Walker, Theories of Uncertainty: Explaining the Possible Sources of Error in
Inferences, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1524 (2001) ("In a deductively valid inference, if the premises are true,
then the conclusion is necessarily true."); see also Ross, supra note 27, at 185 (explaining that deduction is
based upon syllogistic reasoning); Dan Hunter, No Wilderness of Single Instances: Inductive Inference in Law,
48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365, 366 (1998) (Hunter provides an example of a syllogism: "All vehicle drivers driving
under the influence of alcohol shall lose their license. Socrates is a vehicle driver driving under the influence of
alcohol. Thus Socrates shall lose his license.").
29. IRVING M. COP] & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 357 (8th ed. 1990).
30. This method of induction is termed "enumerative induction." Hunter, supra note 28, at 370-72.
31. See L. J. Cohen, Induction and Intuition in the Normative Study of Reasoning: Cohen on Inductive
Reasoning in Philosophy (1991), in MAURICE A. FINOCCHIARO, ARGUMENTS ABOUT ARGUMENTS:
SYSTEMATIC, CRITICAL, AND HISTORICAL ESSAYS IN LOGICAL THEORY 193, 200 (2005) (explaining that

inductive conclusions can be logically justified if the reasons for reaching the conclusion "holds good in certain
varieties of instance").
32. ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, MODES OF THOUGHT 112 (The Free Press 1968) (1938).
33. Id.
34. See id.
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assumptions or inferences might be in error," and such a situation leads to an
incorrect conclusion.35 For example, suppose you ordered a computer from
Company X to be delivered to your front porch. 6 The representative from
Company X told you that your computer arrived at your doorstep at 10:00 a.m.
However, your spouse told you over the phone that there was no computer on the
doorstep at 10:00 a.m. An inference, based upon either data set, that the computer
is or is not on your doorstep, is inherently unreliable and could not be relied upon
for a valid conclusion. Perhaps the delivery company gave Company X
representative false data, your spouse could have simply overlooked the
computer on the porch, or perhaps the computer was actually delivered at 10:30
a.m. In any event, no reasonably reliable inference could be drawn from the
sensory data obtained by the listener.
As a result, the epistemic task in determining the validity of an inductive
inference, then, is a complicated process.37 In the hypothetical above, the task is
to resolve the apparent inconsistency by evaluating the reliability of each piece of
evidence to determine which piece of evidence is more likely correct.38 However,
in some situations, inductive inferences must be made not on inconsistencies, but
on severely limited sets of data.39 Suppose Shopper goes to a super sale at Store Y
and finds a sweater that Shopper wishes to buy. All of the hanging racks
surrounding the sweater contain signs saying seventy percent off; however, the
hanging rack that the sweater is on does not contain a sale sign. Shopper is then
forced, based upon the facts (evidence) that Store Y is having a sale and the
surrounding sale signs, to determine if the specific sweater is also on sale.
Shopper cannot make a reliable determination as to whether the sweater is on
sale without consulting a Store Y employee. In this hypothetical, "[t]he epistemic
challenge is to warrant a conclusion about a population on the basis of evidence
that is merely descriptive of a sample." °
In a simple shopping analogy, the stakes are very low; however, the
importance of valid inductive inference increases exponentially when considering
whether an in-custody suspect can reasonably infer a constitutional right from
stated specific examples. "The task is especially difficult when there is much at
stake, but the evidence is incomplete and the soundness of the inference is
uncertain., 4' Accordingly, in the Miranda context, an in-custody suspect would
need ample, unambiguous data sets in order to arrive at a clear understanding that
he has the right to the presence of an attorney during interrogation, notwith-

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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Walker, supra note 28, at 1529.
See id. (providing a similar hypothetical).
See id. at 1529-31 (explaining the process for determining the validity of inference).
Id. at 1530.
Id. at 1550-51.
Id. at 1551.
Id. at 1523.
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standing the danger of emotional interference on the inductive process in the
interrogation context.
The reliability of conclusions based on inductive inferences increase based
upon the sample size of the specific examples.4'2 That is, the more samples
(specific examples or warnings in the Miranda context) that show a particular
characteristic, the more likely that a reliable generalization (inductive inference)
can be drawn from observing the sample.
From the standpoint of logical analysis, such propositions combine a
reference to some quantity of a subject group identified by a variable,
with a prediction of a second variable. Words such as "some," "many,"
"almost all," and "all" identify some portion of a group ("birds,"
"parents," "children," or "cases of leukemia"), and the proposition
predicates something as true of that portion, such as "being able to fly."
In other words, the subject-predicate structure of the proposition
classifies some quantity of individuals into the categories of two different
variables .3
Thus, the larger the sample size indicated by the predicate, the more reliable the
inferential conclusion about the subject. 44 Likewise, the inverse is also true and a
smaller sample size leaves the inference less reliable. In the Miranda context,
basing a conclusion on such a small sample size, the warning of the right to
remain silent coupled with the right to have an attorney at trial cannot reliably
lead to the conclusion that one has the right to an attorney during interrogation,
notwithstanding the ability of the thinker to think clearly in high pressure
circumstances. In other words, an in-custody suspect must rely on only two
warnings as the entire sample size from which to draw his inference.
In addition, language itself is unreliable to communicate concepts clearly,
especially when diction containing a variety of meanings is employed.4 6 "When
apparent inconsistencies arise within a set of propositions, the first step should be
to investigate the meanings and structures of the linguistic expressions being
used. 4 7 Thus, arriving at a correct inference founded on language-based stimuli
requires clarity of thought and discerning rationale-all of which are likely
lessened in an in-custody interrogation. Discrete discourse communities often
eliminate ambiguity of language by developing a particular technical language
for the purpose of avoiding inconsistencies of meaning."8 While judges and

42.
inference).
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See id. at 1550-53 (explaining that sample size and quality directly correlate with reliability of
Id. at 1552.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1532 (discussing linguistic influence on inference).
Id.
Id.
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lawyers may have little difficulty deciphering the meaning of a given Miranda
warning, it is imperative to keep in mind that the majority of in-custody suspects
do not have the benefit of a legal education to inform their inferential chain.
A second problem regarding inference and language to arrive at meaning
stems from "denotation or reference." 49 A single word can be used to refer to
multiple events, temporal significance, or objects.' ° For example, pronouns such
as "it," "her," and "hers" are prone to use in confusing ways.5' "Expressions
about relationships can create confusion of reference as well, such as 'the next
one' or 'the other one.' With some words the fact of relationship is only implicit,
and error is likely if the terms of the relationship are not clarified."52 As discussed
below, this is precisely one of the major problems that influences an in-custody
suspect's understanding or misunderstanding his right to counsel during
interrogation.
IV. INFERENCE IN THE MIRANDA CONTEXT

Sweeney v. United States53 provides a clear example of how inductive
inference applies to a typical in-custody interrogation. In this case, a defendant
convicted of drug trafficking charges argued that incriminating statements he
made to officers subsequent to his arrest were inadmissible.-4 Prior to
interrogation, agents advised the defendant that he had the right to remain silent,
that any statement of the defendant could be used against him, that he had the
"right to consult counsel," and that he was entitled to use the telephone. 55 The
court of appeals held that the warning of the right to counsel following the
warning of the right to remain silent and the availability of a telephone would
lead a reasonable person to conclude that the right to counsel referred to the
contemplated interrogation.56
This holding rests upon an inferential chain that required the defendant to
engage in a fairly complicated inductive process. 7 For such a conclusion to be
reliable, the warnings, operating as specific examples in the inductive process,
would have to shorten the inductive leap, that is, provide more information from
which to make a generalization." For example, a person who is given thirteen
present-tense warnings can make a strong inference that the fourteenth will also
be present-tense. Conversely, a person given only two present-tense warnings has
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
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Cf Walker, supra note 28, at 1551.
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a considerably weaker inference that the third warning will be present-tense as
well. Thus, for the defendant to infer that each warning applied to the impending
interrogation, he is forced to disregard the possibility that the "right to counsel"
applied in the future, such as at trial. The required inferential chain is the
following two propositions and conclusion:
A. If the right to remain silent applies presently, and
B. The use of a telephone applies presently (presumably because there
was no tense qualifier),
C. Then the right to counsel probably applies presently.
The problems with the inductive leap in the above situation are that the
sample size relied on is too small to be reliable, and the propositions leading to
the conclusion rest on their own inferences. Meaning, the use of the telephone
only applies presently if the absence of a tense qualifier means that the telephone
usage can happen at this moment. If proposition A and B are taken in isolation,
then C is not an inevitable conclusion, nor even a probable conclusion. The
sample size consisting of two warnings is simply too small to warrant a
conclusion regarding the temporal applicability of "the right to counsel." Such a
gamble would be risky in a business situation, let alone an interrogation where
emotion and compulsion can operate to cloud reason.
The above analysis is bolstered by Atwell v. United States.5 9 In this case, the
court held that advising a suspect that he was entitled to consult with an attorney,
retained or appointed, "at anytime" was not clear enough under the directive of
Miranda.6 The court held, "'[a]nytime' could be interpreted by an accused, in an
atmosphere of pressure from the glare of the law enforcer and his authority, to
refer to an impending trial or some time or event other than the moment the
advice was given and the interrogation following., 6' Therefore, this holding
attacks the inductive leap required to conclude that anytime means presently.
"Anytime" could be inferred to mean "presently" or "in the future"; the listener
would have to infer its definition from the contextual surroundings of the
statement. Again, with no sampling of specific examples to base an inference, a
listener simply would be posing a guess rather than a reliable inference.
Miranda requires "that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly
informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer
with him during interrogation. 62 In both examples above, the listener was given
either no specific examples on which to base a conclusion, or very few.
Miranda's requirement for adequate warnings is not satisfied with a series of

59.
60.
61.
62.

398 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 510.
Id.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
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statements requiring the listener to supply the intended meaning of such
statements. 6 The only way to assure adequate warnings is to move away from
allowing inference to suffice and to move towards a deductive strategy to assure
full compliance with the Mirandadirective.
V. TOWARDS UNIFORMITY AND DEDUCTION
Providing uniform warnings that are amenable to deductive certainty more
closely follows the spirit of Miranda.64 Although courts have not yet adopted a
uniform warning requirement for Miranda warnings, the logic of uniformity in
Mirandajurisprudence has been well received in many courts. 65 In United States
v. Noti, the court noted the benefits of the use of Miranda cards to ensure that
suspects have been adequately and consistently warned of the right to the
presence of counsel during interrogation.- The court noted that Mirandadoes not
require a verbatim reading of the warnings, but held "[t]he police can always be
certain that Miranda has been satisfied if they simply read the defendant his
rights from a prepared card. Although we do not require such a reading, we
encourage it. A verbatim reading would, in all instances, preclude claims such as
Noti's." 67
The gravamen of the Noti court's suggestion regarding the use of Miranda
cards is an attack on the inference in the Mirandacontext and the inconsistencies
derived from requiring in-custody suspects to infer their own conclusions from a
set of warnings. 6' The court suggested a major premise - that all suspects be
warned specifically of the right to the presence of counsel during interrogation that if followed would virtually guarantee that in-custody suspects had been
adequately warned.69 In United States v. Tillman, the court further supported the
notion of a uniform Miranda card.70 The court stated that "[w]e join with the
Ninth Circuit in recommending such an approach as this reduces the chances for
error, assists a police officer in the performance of his duties, and protects the
rights of innocent citizens as well as those accused.",7' From a logical standpoint,
both the Noti and Tillman courts advocated not for induction, but for deduction in
the Miranda warning context.

63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that Miranda cards would
ensure uniformity); see also United States v. Tillman, 963 F.2d 137, 141-42 (6th Cir. 1992) (agreeing with the
Noti court's analysis of Miranda cards).
66. Noti, 731 F.2d at 615.
67. Id.
68. See id. (recommending Miranda cards to ensure that defendant's know their rights).
69. See id. (noting that Miranda cards ensure that defendants have been properly warned).
70. 963 F.2d at 141-42.
71. Id.
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Deductive reasoning provides for certainty in conclusions." "A deductive
argument is one whose premisses are claimed to provide conclusive grounds for
the truth of its conclusion. Every deductive argument is either valid or invalid:
valid if it is impossible for its premisses to be true without its conclusion being
true also, invalid otherwise. 7' Deductive reasoning, then, takes the form of a
syllogism. A simple syllogistic line of reasoning is as follows: if all "A"s are
"B"s, and all "B"s are "C"s, then all "A"s are "C"s.74 In this syllogism, if the
premises are valid, then the conclusion is inevitable. 5 A specific example might
help: all in-custody suspects are specifically warned of the right to the presence
of counsel during interrogation; A is an in-custody suspect; therefore, A was
6
specifically warned of his right to the presence of counsel during interrogation.
Deductive reasoning is a more concrete and exacting form of logic than
inductive reasoning because inductive reasoning only leads to probabilities while
deductive reasoning leads to certainty.77 Requiring a warning amenable to
deduction minimizes or eliminates the problems with perception described above
that are common and inherent to induction. "The role of perception in warranting
propositions describing the world [interpreting warnings] depends upon the
calibration of perceptions with the use of certain descriptive predicates. 7 8
However, a uniform warning lessens or eliminates the need for the in-custody
suspect to interpret ambiguous warnings and eliminates the inductive inference.
To illustrate, "[a] proposition is said to have 'existential import' if it is
typically uttered to assert the existence of objects of some specified kind. For
example, the proposition 'There are books on my desk' has existential import,
whereas the proposition, 'There are no unicorns' does not., 79 In other words, a
specific warning such as "you have the right to the presence of counsel during
this interrogation" has clearer meaning than "you have the right to counsel"
because the first warning is tied to a specific time period, whereas the second is
not. Thus, the first warning is amenable to simple deduction, and the second
warning requires inference to determine during what time period counsel is
available. The listener could only infer that "you have the right to counsel"
applies presently. However, the listener could conclusively deduce that "you
have the right to the presence of counsel during interrogation" applies presently.
That is, the suspect will have been clearly and conclusively warned.
Miranda is clear and unambiguous in its directive: "Accordingly, we hold
that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

COPI & COHEN, supra note 29, at 161.
Id.
Ross, supra note 27, at 186.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 182-86 (explaining the differences between inductive and deductive conclusion).
Walker, supra note 28, at 1537.
COPI & COHEN, supra note 29, at 181.
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right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during
interrogation under the system ... we delineate today."8 ° The logical extension of
Miranda is to require a precise warning so that every in-custody suspect is
specifically warned of this important right. Therefore, a warning amenable to
deduction should be used because it is consistent with Miranda, whereas a
warning requiring induction stands in contrast to the holding. The reasoning is as
follows: Miranda requires clarity and certainty as to the conclusion that incustody suspects have the right to the presence of counsel during interrogation;
deduction provides clarity and certainty in conclusions; therefore, Miranda
warnings should be given in a manner amenable to deduction. Conversely,
Miranda requires clarity and certainty as to the conclusion that in-custody
suspects have the right to the presence of counsel during interrogation; induction
provides probability conclusions rather than certainty and is subject to error;
therefore, Mirandawarnings should not be given in a manner requiring induction
in the mind of the listener.
The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) has wisely adopted a set of
uniform warnings that favor deduction rather than induction.8' The warnings
required by the FBI are as follows:
*

Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights.

*

You have the right to remain silent.

" Anything you say can be used against you in court.
" You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you
any questions, and to have a lawyer with you during questioning.
*

If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before
any questioning if you wish.

" If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you
will still have the right to stop answering at any time.
* You also have the right to stop answering at any time you talk to a
lawyer.82
Given that the FBI, one of the world's largest law enforcement agencies, has seen
fit to make its Miranda warnings uniform, it logically follows that all law
enforcement agencies could do so in order to protect citizens' rights against selfincrimination.

80. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
81. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (explaining the FBI's use of standardized Miranda
warnings).
82. Id. at 203 n.4.
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Several law enforcement agencies already require their officers to give clear
and easily understandable Miranda warnings. 3 Oftentimes, investigators are4
specifically told to provide simple, clear warnings to avoid a legal challenge.
Because many law enforcement agencies already require uniformity, it is not
such an insurmountable task to require all law enforcement agencies to apply
uniform warnings that are amenable to deduction.
VI. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT CONSTRUING MIRANDA
Critics will point out that the Miranda Court seemingly left it up to law
enforcement agencies to determine the proper format of the warnings." The
Court has twice confronted the issue of how specific Miranda warnings should
be in order to adequately warn a suspect of his rights. Both California v.
Prysock 86 and Duckworth v. Eagans 7 suggest that Miranda warnings need not be
uniform, but neither case has solved the circuit split below.
88
California v. Prysock involved a juvenile defendant convicted of murder.
The defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress statements made in
what he claimed was a Miranda violation.89 On certiorarito the Supreme Court,
the Court stated that "[t]his Court has never indicated that the 'rigidity' of
Miranda extends to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal
defendant." 90 That is, the Court seemingly held with finality that Miranda does
not require uniform warnings. 9' "Quite the contrary, Miranda' itself
indicated that
92
strictures.
its
satisfy
to
required
was
incantation
no talismanic
Prysock, then, suggests that Miranda only requires the "fully effective
equivalent" of the Miranda strictures.93 However, Prysock is not controlling on
the question of what constitutes an adequate warning as to the right to the
presence of counsel during interrogation because the suspect in Prysock was
given a warning that required no inference. 94 The suspect was warned, "'[y]ou

83.

Richard A. Leo & Welsh S.White, Adapting To Miranda: Modern Interrogators' Strategiesfor

Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L.REV.397, 432-33 (1999).

84. Id.
85. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 ("It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for
protecting the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of their creative rulemaking capacities. Therefore, we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any
particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted.").
86. 453 U.S. 355 (1981).
87. 492 U.S. 195 (1989).
88. 453 U.S. at 356, 358.
89. Id. at 358.
90. Id. at 359.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1981) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476
(1966)).
94. Id. at 356-57.
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have the right to talk to a lawyer before you are questioned, have him present
with you while you are being questioned, and all during the questioning."' 95
These warnings do not require the suspect to draw inferences regarding their
meaning. The warnings clearly and unequivocally lend themselves to deductive
reasoning; that is, the listener can deduce with certainty that the right to have an
attorney applies at the moment of that particular interrogation. In that sense,
Prysock does not address whether inference should be avoided in the mind of the
in-custody suspect.
Similarly, in Duckworth v. Eagan, another murder case appealed due to
alleged Miranda violations, the Court again stressed that Mirandawarnings need
not be verbatim. 96 In Duckworth, the suspect was warned in a manner similar to
the comprehensive FBI warnings:
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You
have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you
in court. You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask
you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You
have this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot
afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will
be appointedfor you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you
wish to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the
right to stop answering questions at any time. You also have the right to
stop answering at any time until you've talked to a lawyer.97
The Federal Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the italicized
language above "was 'constitutionally defective because it denies an accused
indigent a clear and unequivocal warning of the right to appointed counsel before
any interrogation."' 98 However, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit
and held that the warnings "touched all of the bases required by Miranda."99
As with Prysock, the holding in Duckworth is consistent with this Comment
because the suspect was clearly warned of the right to have counsel present
during interrogation.' °° However, the warnings given in Duckworth are not
without problems. The dissent in Duckworth pointed out that "recipients of
Miranda warnings are often 'frightened suspects, unlettered in the law.' The
dissent opined that, because an accused often lacks an understanding of the law,

95. Id. at 356.
96. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202 (1989).
97. Id. at 198 (quoting Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1555-56 (7th Cir. 1988)) (emphasis omitted
and added).
98. Id. at 200 (quoting Eagan, 843 F.2d at 1557).
99. Id. at 203.
100. See id. (explaining that the defendant received clear warnings).
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it would be unreasonable to expect the accused to interpret easily contradictory
and ambiguous 'if and when' warnings."''
Given that the suspects in both Prysock and Duckworth were given precisely
the kind of warnings that are amenable to deductive reasoning, any reliance on
these cases as dispositive regarding the specificity of Miranda requirements is
speculative. The fact is that the Court did not have to take the issue of inductive
reasoning into account when deciding either case. Moreover, even if Miranda
does not require a "talismanic incantation,"''

2

it certainly requires that a suspect

be able to understand the warnings given.' °3 As shown above, the best way to
ensure understanding is through deduction, not induction. Moreover, even if the
holdings of Prysock and Duckworth are read to allow induction, the purpose of
Miranda is to find the right balance between the important governmental interest
in investigation and a citizen's right against compelled self-incrimination. °
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that Miranda warnings are
prophylactic and can evolve and change over time.' 5 "However, in spite of forty
years of legal developments and practical experience, the content of these famous
four warnings has never been modified or even been subjected to systematic
scrutiny."' 6 Given the flexibility that the Court allowed in Miranda regarding the
warnings, it is reasonable to conclude that the warnings themselves seek a
balance between the important government investigatory interests and the
constitutional interests of in-custody suspects. Professor Dressler notes that an
important question in this area is whether the Supreme Court has discovered an
appropriate balance between restrictions on police and constitutional
guarantees.3'° "While the Court has never directly held that the content of the
warnings are subject to modification, the detachment of the warnings from the
concept of Miranda-compulsion, and the recasting of the warnings requirement
as a flexible, prophylactic rule, create leeway for modification."'' 0 8 This Comment
does not propose a modification of the content of warnings; rather, it proposes a
simple, universal clarification that would bring all Miranda warnings clearly
within the scope of the Mirandadecision.

101. Jeff L'Hote, Duckworth v. Eagan: A Semantical Debate or the Continuing Debasement of
Miranda?, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1267, 1290-91 (1990) (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 216
(1989)).
102. California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 360, 359 (1981).
103. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
104. See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr. & Lisa A. Rich, A History of Miranda and Why It Remains Vital Today,
40 VAL. U. L. REV. 685, 705 (stating that Miranda's intent was to "strike a balance between law enforcement
and the criminal suspect that gives the suspect, or any ordinary citizen, a moment to consider the rights
bestowed upon them by the Constitution and make an informed decision about whether to waive those rights").
105. Godsey, supra note 4, at 782.
106. Id. at 782-83.
107. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 14, at 419.
108. Godsey, supra note 4, at 790.
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VII. BENEFITS OF DEDUCTIVE UNIFORMITY

In Miranda,the Court explained several concrete benefits that can be derived
from ensuring that suspects are adequately warned of their right to have counsel
present during interrogation.' 9 If a suspect is warned that counsel can be present,
"the dangers of untrustworthiness" can be mitigated." The probability that
coercion will take place is less than if a suspect is left wondering if he can have a
lawyer with him during interrogation."' In this sense, providing a specific
warning actually streamlines the interrogation process and leaves less doubt as to
whether the suspect was adequately warned and whether the conviction will be
overturned.
Conversely, common sense dictates that the burden on law enforcement to
provide a specific warning from which in-custody suspects can deduce a reliable
conclusion is minimal. As noted above, the FBI already requires its arresting
agents to read uniform Miranda warnings. Simply memorizing or reading from
an agency Miranda card is not too much to ask. Providing uniform Miranda
warnings that are amenable to deduction can actually help law enforcement
agencies obtain the information they seek; that is, it can be used as a strategy for
eliciting information. 2
The most direct way to execute this advice is to read the warnings from
the standard preprinted Miranda form cards [amenable to deduction],
even before engaging in any conversation with the suspect. To the extent
that interrogators follow this practice, they are acting merely as
conveyors of legal information, delivering the warnings in a way that
appears non-partisan. The interrogator does not seek to persuade the
suspect to waive Miranda, or to suggest that some benefit might follow
from such a waiver. Instead, the interrogator merely delivers the Miranda
warnings without any apparent strategy, as if he is indifferent to the
suspect's response.113
Law enforcement agencies, then, can benefit from deductive Miranda warnings
through fewer legal challenges and as a technique to build trust with an incustody suspect. As long as the Miranda warnings are given clearly and in a
manner that inevitably leads to a conclusion that the suspect has a right to have
counsel present during the in-custody interrogation, the officers are free to
interrogate accordingly.

109. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966).
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. See Leo & White, supra note 83, at 432-33 (explaining that interrogators can use clear warnings to
develop trust and avoid legal challenges).
113. Id.
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Some analysts argue that Miranda warnings as applied today inhibit law
enforcement efforts." 4 In 1967, researchers in Pittsburgh discovered that 48.5 %
of suspects confessed their offenses before the Miranda decision."' However,
soon after Miranda, only 32.3 % made confessions. ' 6 Moreover, various studies
since Miranda show that approximately 28,000 violent felony charges are
dismissed annually." 7
Conversely, more recent studies suggest a different scenario regarding
waiver of Fifth Amendment rights." ' "[R]oughly eighty percent of suspects
waive their Miranda rights and talk to the police."" 9 It follows, then, that if this
many suspects agree to talk with police, complete and clear Miranda warnings
would not have the detrimental effect on law enforcement that critics assert.120
The very purpose of the Miranda warnings is to apprise the suspect of his rights.
Arguing that it is a negative that more persons will invoke their rights if clearer
warnings are given seems to suggest that "hiding the ball" is a good thing and
that we, as a society, do not want people to exercise their protective rights. This
cannot be true.
Defenders of Miranda say that the practical effect of Miranda as applied
' 2
today has led to "substantial benefits and vanishingly small social costs."'
Essentially, it is reasonable to argue that Miranda is based on fairness in the
sense that it is unfair and unethical for officers to obtain confessions when a
suspect simply does not understand his rights. It is this logic that mandates
Miranda warnings be given in a clear, specific manner amenable to deduction so
that any waiver of Fifth Amendment rights is done knowingly and voluntarily our accusatorial system of justice requires it.
Uniformity in the Miranda context also greatly benefits courts and the
judicial system. It is common knowledge that some law enforcement officers
by imposing what has become known as the
seek to circumvent Miranda
"question-first tactic."'22 This tactic includes staving off Mirandawarnings until a
confession has occurred or the officers believe a confession is close at hand.'23 In

114. See Richard H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., Miranda inPittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29
U. PITT. L. REV. 1,9-12 (1967) (arguing that statistics show a decrease in confessions).
115. Id.
at 12.
116. Id.
117.

Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387, 391

(1996).
118. See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 276
(1996) (waiver rate of sixty-eight percent).
119. Godsey, supra note 4, at 792.
120. Leo, supra note 118, at 226, 276.
121.

See Stephen 1. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small

Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500 (1996) (arguing that Miranda has not had a detrimental effect on law
enforcement).
122. Seth Goldberg, Comment, Missouri v. Siebert: The Multi-Factor Test Should Be Replaced With A
Bright-Line Warning Rule To Strengthen Miranda's Clarity, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1287, 1289 (2005).

123.

Id.
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response to analyzing the legality of the "question-first tactic," the Supreme
Court established a multi-factor test that essentially becomes a case-by-case
analysis of the circumstances surrounding a warning.'24 "Therefore, courts must
conduct an 'agonizing case by case review process.' -125 However, requiring a
uniform, deductive Miranda warning relieves courts from determining the
validity of Miranda warnings on a case-by-case basis: either the warning was
adequate or not. In this sense, a uniform and specific Miranda warning could
help alleviate some court congestion by removing cases from the docket that
require specific factual analyses.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The solution to the circuit split regarding the specificity of Miranda warnings
is strikingly simple. To ensure that all in-custody suspects are clearly informed of
their right to the presence of counsel during interrogation, officers should
universally employ this simple warning: "You have the right to the presence of
an attorney before and during this questioning."
This warning is amenable to deduction in the sense that it does not require
the suspect to make any kind of inference as to when the right to the presence of
counsel begins and how long it lasts. Rather, the suspect can conclusively deduce
this information. The gravamen of the proposed warning is that it eliminates any
possible subjective coloring of the warning on behalf of the suspect. The
warning, thus, is not subject to interpretation and inference.
The benefits of employing a warning that is not susceptible to inference are
numerous. Such a warning could help to lessen any claim of compulsion, which
was the focus of the Miranda decision, and therefore alleviate congestion in the
already crowded federal dockets. More importantly, if in-custody suspects
choose to waive their rights after receiving such a warning, they will have done
so knowingly and voluntarily. The burden is simply not great enough to ignore
these substantial benefits. "Miranda and its warnings maintain the balance
between law enforcement and the public at large. The warnings serve to remind
both sides of law enforcement that this country is based on individual rights that
cannot be overridden-no matter how noble the cause."' 2 6 For these reasons,
Miranda warnings regarding the right to the presence of counsel should be given
clearly, without room for inferential mistake.

124.
125.
126.
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